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Abstract
We investigate the eect of the volunteering of others on the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will also engage in volunteering activities. The theoretical part of our analysis is
based on a sequential signaling framework, in which the decisions of others to volunteer
are informative as to the benet from volunteering. In this framework, the interaction
between one's private information and the public belief when she is called upon to act
makes it more likely that she will volunteer, given a higher average level of contribu-
tions by her predecessors. To test this empirically, we measure the eect of average
volunteering in the community on the likelihood that an individual will volunteer, con-
trolling for individual and community characteristics. We use Census 2000 Summary
File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement les.
Our results are robust to various choices of sample, by years analyzed, working status,
and whether or not the volunteering included religious activities. We account for re-
ection bias by means of an instrumental variables strategy which further veries the
pattern of our results.
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Economists have become increasingly interested in determining what motivates individuals
to engage in volunteer work and to participate in what has been termed the "unpaid labor"
sector.1 In contrast to earlier research, which considered unpaid labor to be indistinguishable
from leisure, economists have recently begun modeling volunteering and similar activities as
a dierent type of decision. They have also empirically documented (primarily in small ex-
perimental studies) the fallacy of attempting to explain an individual's choice to volunteer
within a purely public goods framework. In the current study, we theoretically and em-
pirically examine an alternative explanation as to why individuals volunteer. Specically,
we show that individuals are more likely to contribute when they observe higher levels of
volunteering by other members of their community.
A particular challenge to the pure public goods framework comes from mounting evi-
dence showing that, although individuals commonly engage in activities which are costly to
themselves and (seemingly) primarily benecial to others, for a signicant class of important
cases, the presence of individuals with other-regarding preferences alone does not suce as
an explanation. There is evidence for some additional private value to be gained from volun-
teering, be it from a motivation to acquire what has been termed \warm glow", \prestige,"
or \self-worth."
Broadening the set of motives that inuence pro-social behavior has led economists to ask
the natural question of how these motives interact with one another and with the economic
environment.2 On the one hand, in some situations, the intrinsic motives of individuals
seem to play such a vital role that providing rewards and punishments to foster pro-social
conduct can actually crowd them out and lead to the perverse eect of reducing individual
contributions both in size and in number. On the other hand, social pressure and norms that
favor pro-social deeds and punish selsh acts do push people towards the former and away
from the latter. To make matters even more complicated, most people value the opinion
others have of them (sometimes referred to as \self-image"), but they also strive to maintain
at least a minimal amount of consistency between their actions and their core values or
beliefs.
These issues are fundamental when it comes to identifying the personal and communal
determinants of pro-social behavior and comparing their relative strengths. Nevertheless,
the actions and interactions of these drivers are contingent not only upon the context of
the pro-social behavior in question (contributing towards a public good, volunteering one's
1See Freeman[1], Govekar and Govekar [2], and Greisling [32]
2See the introduction of Benabou and Tirole [12] for a review of these issues.
1labor or other resources, etc.) but also upon the specic social group from which the social
motives emanate and within which they operate (in conjunction with the personal ones).
It is, therefore, equally imperative to look into the eect of the social group itself on the
pro-social conduct of its members. Within the context of engaging in volunteer work, this is
the primary focus of our analysis.
We investigate the interaction between the characteristics of the community in which an
individual resides and her decision to volunteer. Volunteering, as we see it, is an activity
that imposes costs on the individual and primarily benets other members of the community.
We develop a model of sequential choices in which, at each stage, a dierent member of the
community faces the decision of whether or not to make a contribution towards a public good.
In this setting, the contributions of others provide publicly available information about one's
total net benet (private and social benet minus private cost) from one's own contribution.
This is important information because one's total net benet is not a priori known. Instead,
it depends on the actual desirability of the public good in question, which may itself be a
function of a variety of factors, such as the degree of eciency in the provision of the good,
the good's value relative to other private or public projects that may be funded by individual
resources, etc.
To keep matters tractable, we depict the respective uncertainty by a binary random
variable. When called upon to act, prior to her choice, the individual receives a private
signal regarding the underlying state of nature. She also observes the total number of
past contributions; equivalently, as she knows how many agents have been called upon to
contribute in the past, the average number of past contributions. This simple setting of
sequential learning has an equilibrium in which the average number of past contributions
is positively correlated with the individual's decision to contribute. That is, the higher the
average rate of contributions by others within one's community, the more likely it is that an
individual will choose to contribute.
In the empirical part of our analysis, we show that this positive relationship is indeed
supported by the evidence. We verify that this relationship is robust to the inclusion of
various community and demographic control factors, types of volunteering (nonreligious vs.
a more general measure of volunteering), and populations of interest (working age vs. full).
We also use an instrumental variables strategy to reduce issues of reection bias inherent
in this type of structure. In all the respective scenarios, the results are consistent with our
theoretical prediction.
To the best of our knowledge, within the realm of the volunteering and public goods liter-
ature, we are the rst to approach the interaction between one's own propensity to engage in
2prosocial behavior and that of the others around her from an informational perspective. Our
theoretical framework is the standard one used in the literature on herding and informational
cascades: each agent observes what others do and takes a binary action in a pre-ordered se-
quence. In that literature, the actions of others matter for one's payo only indirectly, by
carrying information regarding the underlying state of the world. In contrast, within our
context, the actions of others also matter directly by determining the total amount of the
public good.
This additional functionality of others' behavior allows the standard model to deliver
results that are not observed in the literature on herds and informational cascades. In
that literature, when agents receive a binary signal, informational cascades occur almost
certainly. As a consequence, there is only very limited social learning; the actions of others
matter only in so far as they bring the public belief to the critical level for a cascade to
begin.3 In our setting, on the other hand, informational cascades occur only in limiting
cases, with a vanishing probability as the size of the community increases. Intuitively, as
long as the sequence of decision makers is long enough, a string of the same choice will have
to eventually be broken because we can neither have too much nor too little of the public
good. When the amount of observed contributions is suciently high, the problem of the
commons manifests itself, precluding further contributions. When it is suciently low, the
net benet from contributing is so high in the good state that an agent prefers to contribute
for any but vanishingly small prior beliefs.
Within the social learning that generically takes place in our setting, the role of the
average number of past contributions turns out to be crucial. On the one hand, this average
is a sucient statistic for the individual posterior belief about the state of world, being
positively (negatively) related to the belief that the state is favorable (unfavorable). On the
other hand, it is positively related to the individual's expected marginal rate of substitution
between contributing and not contributing. In a fully revealing equilibrium, in which an
individual contributes to the public good if and only if her signal is favorable, the decision-
maker compares her expected rate of marginal substitution to her posterior beliefs as if they
3An informational cascade is a situation in which the public belief, gathered from the history of observed
actions, dominates the private signal of any individual so that the action of all subsequent agents do not
depend on their private information. It is a concept distinct from that of a herd, which is dened as an
outcome where all agents take the same action after some period. In a cascade, all agents are herding and,
because actions do not convey any private information, nothing is learned, the cascade goes on forever,
possibly with an incorrect action. In a herd, however, not all agents may be herding and those that do may
herd because of a particular sequence of private signal realizations. In such herds, some social learning does
take place since there is a positive probability that the herd may be broken. See Bikhchandani et.al. [13]
and Chamley [21] for a more detailed analysis and discussion of these points.
3were relative prices in a standard consumer utility maximization problem.
With respect to testing this theoretical intuition empirically, our data set being the largest
and most representative sample of volunteering data available to date, the novelty of our
investigation lies in the extent to which it is comprehensive and allows us to be condent in
its validity.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the
relevant literature while Section III presents the theoretical model and its ndings. Section
IV discusses data sources and Section V outlines the empirical methodology. The empirical
ndings and results are discussed in Section VI and Section VII concludes.
2 Related Literature
As a prerequisite to any attempt to understand how the average volunteering of others in
the community aects one's own propensity to volunteer, we need to identify the reasons
why an individual might choose to volunteer.5 In this section, we rst outline the theories
currently accepted in the literature regarding the individual decision to volunteer, in general
as well as specically within the context of the provision of a public good.
2.1 The Volunteering of Others
Public Good and Private Value
Traditionally, volunteering was considered a purely public good in the economics literature.
As such, invoking the problem of the commons, one would predict an individual's propensity
towards volunteering to decrease as the number of observed contributions to the public good
increased. It might also be expected that private contributions would be crowded out by
governmental provision of the public good.6
These two assertions need not be valid, however, if the very act of contributing towards
a public good brings an individual some private benet alongside the good's social value.
4See Brudney and Gazley [17] for a discussion of the problems that plague data-gathering in the volunteer
sector.
5It should be pointed out that, in this paper, we do not take into account volunteering motivations that
are related to fullling one's particular and explicit obligations, such as requirements of school volunteering
for students. To our knowledge, no such analysis is yet in existence and would be an interesting extension to
the present analysis. For an introduction to service learning as a related concept, see for example McGoldrick
et.al. [37]
6For early work on this topic, see for example Bergstrom et.al. [11]
4Recent empirical evidence does indeed show that, as the number of individual contributions
towards a public good increases, an individual's propensity to contribute can consequently
increase. In particular, Andreoni ([10], [8]) documents that the provision of a public good
appears to increase with the concurrent level of giving in the community and that individual
contributions do not seem to be crowded out by governmental ones.7.
A general idea that has been put forth in the literature to support these ndings is to
regard individuals as impurely altruistic. That is, to view them as receiving a private benet
which is tied to the very act of giving, above and beyond the intrinsic social value of the
public good. In some cases, such as those considered by Andreoni [9], the associated private
valuation may be as simple as a \warm glow" from contributing to the public good; in others,
it may be a bit more complex.8 In what follows, we briey review some examples of factors
that may determine an individual's private value of her public good contribution. They all
highlight the importance of social inuences in establishing private values.9
Socially-Motivated Private Valuations
Studying charitable contributions, Harbaugh [33] as well as Glazer and Konrad [30] found
that many individuals choose to donate their money due to a feeling of \prestige" from being
considered philanthropists. As Francois [28] points out, this kind of prestige from \making a
dierence" seems to be linked to the number of other individuals who are acting in a similar
way. Specically, the more others contribute, the more prestigious they render the cause to
which the individual is called upon to donate. It is also likely that one would want to be
an early contributor to the cause since this would gain her more prestige and attention than
falling within the dense ranks of later, less-visible donors. Regardless of whether it relates
to the timing of the contribution decision, prestige as a motive will operate as one of the
possible social inuences allowing individuals to retain a private value from contributing to
the public good.10
In addition to gaining prestige by being one of the early donators to a charity, individuals
may choose to time their donation in order to gain information on the intrinsic value of the
public good in question. In contrast to the prestige motivation, the informational one would
7For an interesting extension, where individuals have diering valuations they place on the public good,
see Bilodeau and Slivinski [14]
8Andreoni [6] provides an excellent introduction to the issues and research on volunteering and charitable
giving.
9For a more exhaustive overview of the area of social interactions as it relates to economics, see Blume
and Durlauf [16]
10For a more general discussion on this topic, see Carman [19] and Knox [35].
5encourage individuals to contribute only after many others have already done so. The number
of observed donations would then serve as a signal of the charity's quality. This eect was
documented experimentally by Potters et.al. [42] who found that sequential contributions to
a public good can operate as a useful signal when there is uncertainty about its underlying
quality. More precisely, the authors concluded that the informed agents regarding the good's
quality should be the rst to make their decisions in order to provide the uninformed agents
with a signal regarding the quality of the good.11 This \signaling" motivation additionally
helps to explain the nding in Vesterlund [50] that those charities which announce early
contributions and their size receive on average higher total levels of contributions.
Another motivator that is based upon private considerations is what Andreoni [6] refers
to as the "warm glow" eect from contributing to a public good. This may also be linked to
the usefulness an individual attributes to her contribution. Specically, Andreoni presents a
model in which individuals would much rather give to a charity providing x of their dollars to
one recipient rather than distributing their contribution to n recipients and splitting it into
amounts of x/n to be shared by each of the recipients. That is, the size of one's contribution
going to each of the recipients matters for the warm-glow feeling, a theoretical nding lending
support to the idea that individuals may tie their donations to the size of the community
receiving them.12
A dierent possible approach in associating private valuations with public contributions
is to assume that individuals take a moral stance on the issue of volunteering. This is to say
that they might regard free-riding as morally wrong and thus feel an obligation to donate
to the public good. This scenario, put forth by Sugden [46], suggests that donating to the
public good oers individuals the private benet of establishing themselves as moral human
beings.
The aforementioned factors motivating public good contributions through private valua-
tions may all operate in the context of multiple types of charitable behaviors. These could be
(a) donating one's material resources to charity or (b) volunteering one's time or eort to a
common good or cause. This is not at all surprising, since volunteering is sometimes analyzed
in the context of being either a substitute or complement to charitable donations. However,
some of the reasons individuals volunter are distinct from those motivating charitable mone-
tary donations. For instance, individuals may want to volunteer for certain tasks to increase
their human capital, either by complementing interests or skills employed in their paid labor
or, more importantly, during times of unemployment. They may also choose to volunteer
11See also Andreoni [6] for a related nding.
12This is also one of the reasons for our decision to include community size as an explanatory factor in our
empirical analysis, since we believe it to be likely that many donations occur within the community itself.
6because it makes them feel more productive or less socially isolated after retirement. With
the above reasons in mind, we see that the resulting private benet from volunteering can
dier substantially from reasons associated with charitable giving of one's money.
This analysis focuses on the idea of volunteering of one's time in particular. It contributes
to the literature on social interactions by oering an explanation as to how one's social
environment aects one's prosocial behavior using the concept of signaling. In this context,
individual prosocial behavior is aected by one's community and the actions of its members,
not only due to specic characteristics of her community and her relationships with others,
but also because of the underlying information these provide about the value of the prosocial
behavior itself.
3 The Model
To model the interaction between the prosocial behavior of others and one's own choice to
engage or not in such behavior, we consider the following scenario. A community consists
of a nite number N of members who are going to decide in sequence whether or not to
contribute towards a given public good, whose total amount is given, of course, by the sum
of all individual donations added to any social endowment the community might start with.
Each individual's decision is between increasing the amount of the public good available
in the community and decreasing her own consumption of a given consumption good by
the same amount, private consumption being what remains from the individual's wealth
endowment once her public good contribution has been deducted. And what makes this
decision not trivial is the fact that the relative value the individuals of this community
attach to private versus public consumption is stochastic. To keep matters tractable, we will
depict the corresponding uncertainty by a doubleton state space, 
 = f0;1g, partitioning
the world into an unfavorable (! = 0) and a favorable (! = 1) state. Our focus being on the
individual decisions to whether or not contribute towards the public good, the underlying
state being favorable (unfavorable) is meant to depict the situation in which it is socially
optimal (i.e., it would be chosen by a social planner) for everyone in the community to (not)
contribute.
Prior to making her decision, each agent obtains two pieces of information regarding this
underlying uncertainty. The rst one is private and comes in the form of a binary signal.
All signals are drawn from the set S = f0;1g and are equally informative about the true
state of the world, which has already obtained prior to the beginning of the game. When
the typical agent in the sequence receives the signal sn = 1 (sn = 0), she takes it to mean
7that the probability of the state being favorable (unfavorable) is q = Pr[sn = 1j! = 1] =
Pr[sn = 0j! = 0]. To ensure that the actual order in which the agents are called upon to act
does not matter, the signal precision will be common across all individuals.13 Of course, the
signals are informative (q > 1=2).
The second piece of information an agent has concerns the actions of her predecessors
in the sequence. The possible action of the typical individual is xn 2 X = f0;xg. Being
binary, it reects her choice to contribute either an amount x towards the community-wide
stock of the public good or nothing. Having x exogenously xed, it abstracts from factors
that inuence an individual's decision of how much to contribute (such as, for example, the
opportunity cost of one's resources, time, or eort). It allows us, therefore, to maintain the
focus of the analysis on the decision to contribute or not per se; in particular, on how this
decision is inuenced by the behavior of one's peers within a context of signalling.
It is standard in this setting to assume that each player observes the entire history of
past actions but none of the past signals. To take, that is, the historical information up
to the nth period of play as being carried forward by an element of the set X n 1. For our
purposes, however, it is enough to consider instead the sum of its elements, Xn 1 =
Pn 1
i=1 xi.
In other words, the total amount of past public good contributions (along, of course, with
any initial social endowment) is the publicly available information at the beginning of each
period of play.
For the typical player, therefore, a (mixed) strategy in this game is a mapping n :
S X n 1 7! (X), assigning the probability xn
s;n (Xn 1) on the action xn when the agent's
signal is s and the history she observes is Xn 1. To keep the analysis tractable, however, we
will restrict our attention to strategies that do not depend upon the history of play. That
is, to mappings n : Sn 7! (X) that assign the probability xn
s;n on the action xn when the
agent's signal is s, irrespectively of the history she observes. Of course, this does not mean
that the history the player observes does not matter for her play. For, in conjunction with
her signal realization, Xn 1 does aect her belief about ! and, along with the strategies she
believes the other players to be following, the rule that determines her optimal action.
As is well-known, if we let n = Pr[! = 1jXn 1;~  n] denote the prior (to her signal
realization) belief of the typical player about the event ! = 1, given the history of prior play
Xn 1 and her belief that her opponents are following the strategy prole ~  n, her posterior
13Suppose otherwise and let qn be the probability in question for the typical agent. Consider also the signal
realizations fsn;sn+1g = f1;0g. By (1), 1;n =
qnn




















, the two opposing signals cancel out (so that 0;n+1 =
n) only if qn = qn+1. It is trivial to verify that the same is true when fsn;sn+1g = f0;1g.
8belief about this event will be given by14
1;n =
qn
qn + (1   q)(1   n)
0;n =
(1   q)n
(1   q)n + q (1   n)
(1)
when she receives the signal sn = 1 and sn = 0, respectively. Needless to say, 1 =  reects
the common prior belief at the beginning of the game about the state being favorable. As
usual with an informative signal, the posterior of the typical agent is (i) stronger (weaker)
than the prior under sn = 1 (sn = 0), and (ii) increasing in the prior under either signal.15
The agent's posterior reect her belief, once all her available information has been utilized,
about the underlying state of the world. It matters because it determines the payo from
either of her two available actions. Given that the true state is ! and the actions of all other
players are given by the prole fxigi2f1;:::;Ngnfng, her payo is
Un;!
 













if she doesn't. In words, the typical agent has state-dependent preferences over consumption
bundles of two goods, a private and a public, representable by the function Un;! (c;G) with
all quantities denominated in units of a single underlying commodity of exchange (such
as money). The total amount of the public good G is given by the sum of all individual
donations added to any initial social endowment. The amount of the private good c is the
remainder from the individual's wealth endowment en once her public good contribution has
been deducted.
Regarding her preferences, we will assume throughout that Un;! is everywhere dieren-
tiable, strictly increasing with respect to either of its arguments (A.1), and strictly concave
14As usual, ~  n denotes the strategy prole of all other players, (1;:::;n 1;n+1;:::;N). Of course,
n depends here only upon the (1;:::;n 1) part of ~  n. Recall also that the strategies do not depend
here upon the histories of past plays while the action space is binary. Hence, for the probability that the
player will volunteer for the task given her strategy n and the signal sn, we have Pr[xn = xjsn;n] = 1
sn;n
with 0
sn;n = 1   1
sn;n being the probability that she will not.








9in the second (A.2).16 More importantly since (A.1)-(A.2) are completely standard condi-
tions, we require that the marginal utility of either good cannot fall when the quantity of
the other increases (A.3) and that the state of nature matters by aecting the marginal rate
of substitution between the two goods.
Specically, the marginal rate of substitution of public for private consumption is always
greater (less) than unity when the favorable (unfavorable) state obtains (A.4). We take,
therefore, the underlying uncertainty to be about the relative value the individuals in this
community attach to consuming the private versus the public good. For, if these two goods
were traded in a perfectly competitive market at say prices pc and pG, respectively, this
condition would require that pG > pc (pG < pc) when ! = 1 (! = 0).17 That is, in
the favorable (unfavorable) state, it is strictly dominant for all individuals (thus, socially
optimal) to (not) contribute to the public good.
Formally, the following conditions will be taken to apply for all agents n 2 f1;:::;Ng at
either state.






> 0 8(c;G) 2 R++  R+
(A.2) Risk aversion with respect to the public good:
@2Un;! (c;G)
@G2 < 0 8(c;G) 2 R++  R+
(A.3) The marginal utility from each good is non-decreasing in the amount of the other:
@2Un;! (c;G)
@c@G
 0 8(c;G) 2 R++  R+
(A.4) The marginal utility of private consumption is dominated by (dominates) that of the
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< 0 8z 2 (0;x) 8G 2 R+
16Concavity of the utility function with respect to private consumption is not necessary given that the
choice problem in this dimension is discrete.
17Assuming, of course, an interior optimal consumption bundle (c;G) 2 R2
++.
10Putting together the elements of the model described above, given that the others are
following the strategy prole ~  n, the expected payo of the nth agent when she receives
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Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;!]Un;! (en   x;Xn 1 + xn + kx)
is the conditional (on the state realization) expected payo of the player. As shown in the
Appendix, moreover, the conditional (upon the underlying state and her successors' strategy
prole ~ n) probability that exactly k 2 f0;:::;N   ng successors will contribute is given by
























In presenting the theoretical results that will form the basis of our empirical investigation,
it will be of signicant notational convenience to dene
xUn;! (c;G) = Un;! (c   x;G + x)   Un;! (c;G)
18Throughout this exposition, we adopt the vector notation ~ n = (n+1;:::;N) and ~ xn = (xn+1;:::;xN).
Notice also that the latter vector is random from the perspective of the nth player in the sequence; it depicts
the yet unknown prole of play by her successors.
11Using this quantity, it is trivial to verify that the necessary and sucient condition for the







k=0 Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 1]xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
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The Bounds of Altruism
The theoretical framework described above is the standard one used in the literature on
herds and informational cascades: each agent observes what others do and takes a zero-one
action in a preordered sequence. Yet, in that literature, the actions of others matter for one's
payo only indirectly, as they carry information regarding the underlying state of the world.
By contrast, in this model, they matter also directly since they determine the total amount
of the public good. This additional functionality of others' behavior delivers results that are
not observed in the literature on herds and informational cascades. In that literature, when
agents receive a binary signal, informational cascades occur almost surely. As a consequence,
there is only very limited social learning; the actions of others matter only in so far as they
bring the public belief to the critical level for a cascade to start.
In our setting, on the other hand, informational cascades occur only as in limiting cases.
Intuitively, as long as the sequence of agents is long enough, a sequence of the same action
herd will have to be broken eventually because we can have neither too much nor too little
of the public good. When the amount of observed contributions is suciently high, the
problem of the commons kicks in and putting an end to the string of further contributions
are precluded. When it is suciently low, the net benet from contributing is so high in the
good state that an agent prefers to contribute ex-ante for any but vanishingly small prior
beliefs.
The respective bounds can be identied through the functions MRSmax;MRSmin : R+ 7!
R++ which are dened by














12These relations provide sucient conditions (Claims 2 and 5) for the two types of cascades
our setting allows for (situations, that is, in which every or no one contributes). By doing so,
however, they also delimit these situations indicating that they may occur only as limiting
cases. On the one hand, as long as the existing amount of the public good is not too large,
no contributions cascades are ruled out (4). On the other, contributions cascades are not
possible in large communities (Corollary 3), unless the required individual contributions are
vanishingly small and there is no initial social endowment of the public good (Corollary 6).
The Eect of the Average Level of Past Contributions
We are left, therefore, with the most possible scenario being the fully-revealing, symmetric
equilibrium in which the n0th agent and each of her successors contribute if and only if








N   n + 1
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hold for every n 2 fn0;:::;Ng.
These sucient conditions are related to the average level of past contributions the nth
agent observes, xn = Xn
n 1, in the following way: a higher xn makes it more likely that they
will be met. To see this, observe rst that, other things being equal, the right-hand side of
either inequality is increasing in xn because  
xUn;1(c;)
xUn;0(c;) is strictly decreasing.19
By contrast, the left-hand side of either inequality is decreasing with xt. This can be
veried by noticing rst that it is the net number of past signals that matter for one's
posterior belief. Once this observation has been made, it is straightforward to check that,
for xn = 0:5, an equal number of the two signals have been observed so that the prior at the
beginning of the nth stage is the same as that at the beginning of the game itself, n = . If
xn > 0:5 (xn < 0:5), on the other hand, there have been more favorable (unfavorable) signals
in the rst n 1 stages. Specically, for xn > 0:5, there have been exactly (2xn   1)(n   1)
19This is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2 of Appendix C.
13more favorable signals.20 The prior, therefore, is
n =
q(2xn 1)(n 1)
q(2xn 1)(n 1) + (1   q)
(2xn 1)(n 1) (1   )






(1 2xn)(n 1)  + q(1 2xn)(n 1) (1   )
Clearly, in either case, n and, thus, j;n for j = 0;1 are increasing in xn.21
The monotonicity relations exhibited by the sides of the rst inequality above suggest
unambiguously that an increase in xn renders it more likely that the inequality will be met.
With respect to the sides of the second inequality, both are increasing in xn. Recall, however,
that the two inequalities above are sucient conditions for the fully-revealing equilibrium
under study. The sucient and necessary ones are given by (6), the right-hand inequality of
which is a weaker condition that the second inequality above. And as the quantity on the
right-hand side of the rst inequality above is a lower bound for the quantity in the middle
of (6), we are guaranteed that the latter quantity increases with xn.
Therefore, the only case when it would not be more likely for (6) to be met when xn
increases is the case in which the quantity in the middle of (6) increases with xn but not
as fast as 1
0;n decreases. Whenever this is true, however, it becomes more likely that the
right-hand side inequality of (6) will be violated. Equivalently, that the agent will contribute
irrespectively of the signal she receives. Clearly, a higher xn exerts always a positive eect
towards the agent contributing, at least when her signal is favorable.
To test this relation empirically, we will take henceforth x = 1 so that the relevant
decision-making dimension is indeed the binary choice between volunteering or not. We will
also focus on the decision of the last individual in the sequence of contributions that occur
in a given community during a given year. This allows us to interpret the average level of
past contributions, xN, as the average level of contributions in a community in the current
year; which is the only consistent measure of average contributions by others that can be
obtained from our data.
20Let kn 1 be the number of favorable signals in the past n   1 stages. The average contribution level is
then xn =
kn 1
n 1 while the number of unfavorable signals is k0
n 1 = n   1   kn 1. But kn 1 > k0
n 1 is the
same as 2kn 1 > n   1 while kn 1   k0




qn+(1 q)n(1 ). Then dy=dn is proportional to qn [qn + (1   q)
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n (1   )ln(1   q)] = qn (1   q)
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The empirical portion of our analysis makes use of two data sets: the 2004-2007 Septem-
ber supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Census 2000 Summary
Files (STF3). The CPS and Census les were matched using Core Based Statistical Areas
(CBSA's) via a county-level match.22
The CPS September supplement is unique with respect to other CPS supplements in its
focus on questions related to individual volunteering. Our analysis focuses on individuals
considered to be "adults" (ages 15 and up). Our robustness analysis restricts the sample
further to include only working-age individuals (i.e., aged 25-65). We use this additional
restriction because, as Mutchler et.al. [41] point out, it is possible that retirees or students
volunteer for dierent reasons than do individuals currently in the workforce.23
The CPS information employed in our empirical investigation includes individual-level
demographic characteristics and information on whether an individual chose to volunteer
and for which organizations. Specically, from the CPS data, we use information on an
individual's gender, age, race, educational attainment, family income, family structure and
size, as well as marital and employment status.24 These variables will henceforth be collec-
tively referred to as DEMOG. Also from the CPS data set, we import a binary variable
denoting whether or not an individual volunteered, and note also the particular organiza-
tions for which he or she did so, paying particular attention to whether he or she volunteered
22At rst, we attempted to match the two datasets entirely at the county level using county of residence
information in the CPS. This strategy was abandoned due to the large number of individuals for whom county
information in the CPS was unavailable. Instead, we adopted the method of matching the CBSA of residence
in the CPS data to the corresponding county(ies) in the Census data. This matching technique alleviated
the problem of missing CPS residence information signicantly, allowing us to keep a substantially larger
fraction of the data. Unfortunately, in order to maintain consistency of measurements for the merged years,
we had to focus only on the years 2004-2007 as these are the ones for which CBSA information is available in
the CPS. The 2002-2003 September Volunteering Supplements do have county and Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) information, however, they do not provide information on CBSA of residence since CBSA was
not yet in use at that time in the supplements. It should also be noted that county information was generally
unavailable for the CPS observations in the New England states. For these states, a New England City and
Town Area(NECTA) to CBSA match was virtually impossible since there is a many-to-many relationship
between NECTA's and CBSA's, even before accounting for county locations.
23Regarding its time span, our robustness analysis employs only the last two years of our data (2006-
2007). We employed this constraint in order to facilitate a comparison of results between our baseline and
IV specications.
24Family structure denotes the presence of children of various ages in the individual's home. More precisely,
the variables used to depict marital status are coded as: never married, married and spouse present, married
and spouse absent, and divorced or separated.
15for a religious organization. Our empirical analysis does not include the number of hours
volunteered. This dimension of an individual's contribution decision is not captured by our
theoretical structure and, to maintain rigor and consistency, our empirical investigation stays
as much as is possible within the limits of our theoretical intuition.25
Our intuition for including the DEMOG control characteristics in our analysis is sup-
ported by the following evidence. As Simmons and Emanuele [45] document, females volun-
teer on average more and are thought to be dierentially altruistic, at least in some settings,
than males. According to Dee [23], moreover, wealth and education are intimately associated
with an individual's likelihood of being civic-minded and engaging in volunteer activities.
Regarding family structure and size, individuals with children, and in particular small chil-
dren, are more likely to volunteer, at least for some types of organizations. Employment
status is also important because of the possibility that individuals are either trading o vol-
unteering with paid work in an eort to increase human capital or life satisfaction or instead,
according to average statistics, such as in Kulik [36], the employed are also volunteering at
higher rates. Finally, race is often implicated as aecting not only the choice of volunteering
but also the type of the chosen volunteer activity. This eect is especially strong in studies
of religious volunteering, such as in Musick et.al. [40].26
From the Census data, we gathered information on the average characteristics of the
CBSA area.27 Specically, we included as controls the total population size (and its square),
the average CPI-adjusted income level (and its square), and the fraction living in an urban
location in the CBSA area. We also employed the fraction of various racial groups in the
CBSA-area as part of the area-level controls. In what follows, these location-related variables
25We did examine regression specications using hours of volunteering as an explanatory variable. Com-
pared to the regressions in this paper (which use the binary indicator of whether or not an individual
volunteered), those results (not presented here but available upon request) showed somewhat weaker rela-
tionships with the community average level of contributions. This is not surprising since the average level
of volunteering in one's community ought to have a larger inuence on one's choice as to whether or not
to volunteer than on the choice of hours. Our reasoning being that the latter decision depends to a much
larger extent on factors, such as the opportunity cost of one's time and eort, that are not related directly
to the information one has about the quality of the public good or the importance of the cause about which
one is called upon to volunteer. Within our theoretical framework, it is this information that provides the
dimension on which the average level of volunteering in the community operates.
26The regression coecients on these variables are not shown in our regression results due to length of
exposition, and also due to the fact that these coecients are not the main consideration of our analysis.
Results available upon request.
27We use the term \CBSA area" to reect the fact that we averaged information across all counties within a
particular CBSA. To dene a \CPS-CBSA area," an additional (and easily met within our sample) restriction
was that at least 10 individuals had to be found in the area.
16will be collectively referred to as CBSACHAR.28
Finally, regarding the average level of volunteering in the community, we created a mea-
sure of the average level of volunteering that occurred within the CBSA area in the current
year (using the leave-out mean to mitigate reection bias) and also employing a two-year lag.
We chose two years since it is a long enough time period for our instrumentation strategy
(which is discussed in detail in the methodology section) and it further allows us to main-
tain more than one year of data. We used the same strategy for nonreligious volunteering,
constructing average values in the current year as well as after employing a two-year lag.
It should be emphasized that nonreligious volunteering is examined separately and in detail
due to the possibility that it diers in motivation from religious volunteering.29 Within our
sample of volunteers, we considered as "non-religious" volunteers those individuals who had
not volunteered for a religious or church-based organization. 30
5 Empirical Analysis
The primary goal of our empirical investigation is to determine the eect of average volun-
teering by others on one's probability of engaging in volunteer work, after we have accounted
for other factors at the individual and area-level of analysis which may aect one's volun-
teering decision. We have generally for indiivdual i in CBSA area j:
V OLi;j = f (DEMOGi;CBSACHARj;AV GV OLj)
28We experimented with regression specications including measures of fractionalization (by race, immi-
grant, and income inequality using Gini coecients) at the CBSA area-level as control variables. These were
constructed in the same way as the ethno-linguistic type of fractionalization measures. Empirically, these
required a slightly less favored measure of race for the individual-level since our probit models using the
same racial structure as in this analysis did not achieve numerical convergence. Nevertheless, also in these
alternative race-coded models, the average level of volunteering in the community has a positive eect on an
individual's decision to volunteer, both in the baseline OLS/probit regressions as well as in their respective
instrumented versions. This was true with respect to both general and non-religious volunteering. We also
used variants of our fraction urbanized vs. total population size and found no substantive dierence from
including both in the regressions. We chose to include both population size and fraction urbanized so that
we could distinguish larger areas from simply dierent types of areas by urban-rural distinction.
29See for example Isham et.al. [34], Tao and Yeh [47], and Segal et.al. [44].
30More precisely, we used the responses to the question in the survey asking about the organization for
which the individual had volunteered. Answering that one had volunteered but not for a religious organization
renders one a \nonreligious" volunteer. The dierence in questions asked changes the respective sizes of the
regression samples.
17where V OL is the binary volunteering decision (either total or non-church), DEMOG are
demographic characteristics of the individual, CBSACHAR are characteristics of the CBSA
area, and AV GV OL measures the average level of volunteering in the area.
We instantiate this general model with a probit structure (and a dierenced probit for
marginal eects). Specically, we view each individual as having some inherent desire to
volunteer and actually doing so once this desire exceeds an unknown threshold . This can
be represented with a latent variable structure where V OL is the latent desire to volunteer




i;j = 0 + 1DEMOGi + 2CBSACHARj + 3AV GV OLj + i
V OLi;j =
(
1 if V OL
i;j > 
0 if V OL
i;j  
for some value . All of our regressions additionally include state and year xed eects,
clustering of standard errors by CBSA, and probability weighting for sample inclusion.
The issue of reection bias of focus in our analysis is in the decision to volunteer condi-
tional on average volunteering rates in the community. As mentioned earlier, we instrument
for average volunteering in the current year (leave-out-mean) with the two-year lagged value
of average volunteering in the CBSA.31 This instrument is not weak since, in the rst stage,
our F-statistic is above 10 in all cases.32
To further test the robustness of our Probit results, we compare them with those from
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. Even though the linearized probability model is
clearly an inferior t compared to the Probit one, we do present the results for reasons of
31Technically-speaking, it is sucient to use one year's lagged value of the level of average volunteering
because of the sampling design of the CPS data. We nevertheless chose a longer lag to increase the plausibility
of our instrument.
32We did attempt to use several other instrumentation strategies. For instance, one approach was to use
as an instrument the average observable demographic characteristics of volunteers in the community. Still
another was to instrument for the amount of non-church volunteering activity by employing the number of
churches and measures of church-going behavior in the community (with respect to both catholic only as
well as all churches). Our instruments suered from being too weak to reasonably employ in the current
analysis. In particular, they were weaker than the rst stage of the instrument we nally settled upon. Of
course, our instrument of interest in this analysis, namely, the two-year lagged value of average volunteering,
does not fully account for individuals sorting by location. It is, therefore, possible that this behavior aects
an individual's likelihood of volunteering. This will, however, operate in conjunction with the informational
eect that the average level of volunteering in the community has in our signalling framework. Given that
this latter relation is the focus of our empirical investigation, our primary concern is that our instrumental
strategy address the issue of reection bias.
18completeness in our exposition. For the ith individual in the jth CBSA area, the OLS model
is specied as follows:
V OLi;j = 0 + 1DEMOGi + 2CBSACHARj + 3AV GV OLj
6 Empirical Findings
Summary Statistics
Table 1 displays the mean, minimum, and maximum of each variable in our analysis, the full
sample including all individuals in the CPS September Supplement Files (2004-2007). By
contrast, the regressions in Tables 3 and A1 refer to an age-restricted sample (age 15 and up
or age 25-65, respectively). Even though, for reasons of generality in the reported results, we
chose to focus on the full sample, the age-restricted samples show similar patterns of results.
In Table 1, means are shown for the full sample as well as by year. The annual results
are quite similar albeit with a few exceptions. In particular, the fraction of individuals with
a family income above $75,000 varies from a low of 29% in 2004 to a high of 35% in 2007.
Variation over time is also present in the the fraction of who volunteer, going from a high of
30% in 2004 to a low of 27% in 2007.33 We feel that there may have been a break in volunteer
activities with a greater number of individuals choosing to volunteer at the beginning of the
2004-2007 period due to outside environmental factors. There is also some small variation
in the composition of individuals based on education level and age. Overall, however, the
similarities in the summary statistics of our sample over the relevant time period are such
that they do not point to any signicant biases in the data.
Table 2 displays the breakdown of volunteering by category, amongst the individuals who
chose to volunteer. Of course, there are discrepancies in the percentages for religious volun-
teering between this table and the preceding one because the respective ratios use dierent
denominators.34 It is clear from this table that volunteering for religious organizations, chil-
33Since it was reported in a categorical fashion, individual income data from the CPS les could not
reasonably employ a CPI-adjustment. This partially explains the variation we see over time in the summary
statistics of individual income at the highest brackets. We did run our regression specications with and
without CPI-adjusted average income in the CBSA area to create conformity of CPI-adjustments in our
personal and average-area income variables. The respective results were not distinguishably dierent in any
way. The eects of income were also similar when our regressions were run with yearly data rather than
using the full sample, further showing little reliance of our results on the CPI-adjustment.
34Specically, this table shows the percentage who do volunter work of a particular type, using, as the
denominator representations of dierent types of volunteering in the community. In contrast, table 1 uses
the full population as the denominator.
19dren's educational or sports groups, as well as social and community service is generally the
largest portion of volunteer work in this survey. Together, these three categories account for
between 71% and 76% of the volunteering activities in any year of the sample. The observed
high rate of participation in religious organizational volunteering is an additional reason for
separating out this type of volunteer work in the regression portion of our analysis. We note
that, despite a few uctuations, the time period under study is characterized by a relatively
constant ow of volunteer work by type of activity.35
Regression Analysis
Table 3 displays the eect of average level of volunteering in the CBSA on an individual's
likelihood of engaging in volunteer work. Controls for demographic and local area character-
istics were added into the regressions in a progressive fashion. The results are shown both for
the probit as well as the OLS linearized regressions. Coecients are shown with t-statistics
in brackets. Marginal probit coecients are in italics below the probit coecients and their
t-statistics. Panel A shows the eect on volunteering in general while Panel B depicts the
eect on non-religious volunteering in particular. Each panel reports the results from 11
regressions, 3 OLS, 3 Probit, 2 IV, and 3 Marginal Probit.
It is clear from this table that the average level of volunteering in one's CBSA area has
a positive impact on one's likelihood of engaging in volunteer work. This is true in both
the regular OLS/Probit as well as in the instrumented regressions. It is also true both for
volunteering in general as well as volunteering for non-religious organizations in particu-
lar. Coecients in the instrumented versions are somewhat larger than in the OLS/Probit
regressions and display smaller t-statistics.
The decrease in t-statistics is to be expected because we are using an instrumental vari-
able (and also because we are using a larger sample for the OLS/Probit regressions) while
the increase in size shows evidence that we may indeed see some problems of bias in our
relationships.36 It is also clear that controlling for measures of individual and community
characteristics, while reducing the eect of average volunteering (because presumably there
will be some relationship between other characteristics of communities and individuals and
the volunteering rate), does not manage to entirely erase the relationship. The coecient on
35Notice that changes in the identication of volunteering organizations over time (the inclusion of immi-
gration volunteering being one of the most important) altered the way these questions are coded. This is
why an \other" category is missing from our 2007 data and explains part of the variation by category.
36The robustness check of Table A1 does not strictly counter this particular table since we are also focusing
on the working age population in Appendix Table 1. We did, however, see more similar coecients between
the IV and OLS/Probit results when only using years 2006-2007 and retaining the same age structure.
20the average level of volunteering in the community remains highly signicant and positive.
Table A1 further conrms the strength and direction of this relationship. The results are
not substantially altered when the investigation is restricted to the working age population
with a focus on only the years 2006-2007.
7 Conclusions
We examined the eect of average community-level volunteering as creating a signal for
whether people will individually choose to volunteer. Our theoretical model predicted that
individuals choose to volunteer with a higher probability when receiving signals that there
are higher levels of volunteering within their community. This is true because of theoretical
herding that will occur in equilibrium.
We substantiated this theoretical prediction with empirical data from the Census Sum-
mary Files and CPS Supplement data and found that it is not simply a reection of com-
munity characteristics or demographic characteristics known to correlate with volunteering.
Our result was true regardless of whether we focused on the working-age or full popu-
lation of individuals and whether we examined volunteering generally or only non-religious
volunteering. Thus, our result is not driven by religious volunteering, nor is it only true
for the retired or student populations. Our result is not unique to a particular econometric
technique: It is true whether we use a probit or a linearized regression model. Our results
also obtain after introduction of our instrument to deal with the issue of reection bias.
We believe that our work has made a step forward in understanding how the volunteering
of individuals in the community as a whole aect individual choices of whether or not to
volunteer.
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25A Proofs
Claim 1 For n 2 f1;:::;Ng, let the nth agent observe Xn 2 f0;:::;(n   1)xg past contri-







N   n + 1
!
xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)













are sucient for the fully-revealing symmetric equilibrium in which this agent and all her
successors follow the strategy of contributing if and only if they receive a good signal.
Proof. As we have shown in the main text, given the strategic prole ~ n of her successors,
the necessary and sucient condition for the nth agent to contribute i sn = 1 is the










j~ n;! = 1
#
(4)




















j~ n;! = 1
#
(5)









j~ n;! = 0
#
Observe now the following fact
Lemma 1
xUn;0 (c;G) < 0 < xUn;1 (c;G) 8(c;G) 2 R++  R+
Proof. Recall the denition of xUn;! (c;G) in the main text. It is the dierence between
two utility dierences:
Un;! (c   x;G + x)   Un;! (c   x;G)   [Un;! (c;G)   Un;! (c   x;G)]




@G dz by the fundamental theorem of calcu-












@c dz, taking z = c   w.
If ! = 0, we have
Un;0 (c   x;G + x)   Un;0 (c   x;G) =
Z x
0






@Un;0 (c   x + z;G)
@c
dz
= Un;0 (c;G)   Un;0 (c   x;G)
the inequality following from (A.4). The argument for the case ! = 1 is trivially similar. 
Using this result, the system (4)-(5) can be written more compactly as follows
1
1;n
























Consider now the last agent in the sequence. As there is no one to act after her, (6) reads
1
1;N







For the penultimate individual, on the other hand, the conditional (on the state and her
successor's strategy) expected payo is given by


















UN 1;1 (eN 1   x;XN 2 + x)


















UN 1;0 (eN 1   x;XN 2 + x)
if she contributes, and






































27if she doesn't. That is, for the penultimate player, (6) is given by37
1
1;N 1
  1 <  
P1
k=0 Pr(xN = kxjN;! = 1)xUN 1;1 (eN 1;XN 2 + kx)
P1





In a similar fashion, the conditional expected payo of the N  2 individual in the sequence
can be expressed as








Pr[XN   XN 2j(N 1;N);! = 0]UN 2;0 (eN 2   x;XN 3 + (k + 1)x)
if she contributes, and








Pr[XN   XN 2j(N 1;N);! = 0]UN 2;0 (eN 2;XN 3 + kx)






k=0 Pr[XN   XN 2 = kxj(N 1;N);! = 1]xUN 2;1 (eN 2;XN 2 + kx)
P2





37The shorthand notation we are using here merits some explanation. As the signal realiza-
tions occur independently of the history of play, when the true state of nature is !, under the
strategy N and the history XN 1, we have Pr[xNjN;!] = Pr[sN = 1j!]Pr[xNj1;N (XN 1)] +
Pr[sN = 0j!]Pr[xNj0;N (XN 1)] in general. Yet, as the players' strategies are independent here of his-
tory, this sum reads Pr[sN = 1j!]Pr[xNj1;N] + Pr[sN = 0j!]Pr[xNj0;N]. Hence, the probability that
the last player will contribute is q1
1;N + (1   q)1
0;N when ! = 0 and (1   q)1
1;B + q1
0;B otherwise.
Pr[xN = 0jN;!], on the other hand, is given by Pr[sN = 1j!]0
1;N + Pr[sN = 0j!]0
0;N which reads
q0
1;N + (1   q)0
0;N when ! = 1 and (1   q)0
1;N + q0
0;N otherwise.
28The conditional probabilities in this expression are derived as follows. Conditional on the
underlying state of the world and the strategy prole (N 1;N), the probability that exactly
one amongst the two successors of the N   2th agent will contribute is given by


































































































The conditional probability that both of her successors will contribute is














































Finally, the probability that no contributions from the last two players will be observed is














































It is actually straightforward to verify that












and to proceed inductively to obtain (2) in the main text. The conditional expected payo








Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 0]Un;0 (en   x;Xn 1 + (k + 1)x)








Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 0]Un;0 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
if she doesn't. Clearly, the two system of inequalities in (3) is necessary and sucient for
the player to contribute i sn = 1.
Observe now that conditions (A.2) and (A.3) guarantee that xU! (c;) is strictly de-
creasing.
Lemma 2 8c;G;G0 2 R+ and 8! 2 f0;1g: G0 > G only if xU! (c;G0) < xU! (c;G)


















@c by (A.3). 
Given that we restrict our attention to strategies that depend only upon the players' signals,
this result enables us to determine some sucient inequalities for (3) to obtain. To this end,
consider rst the nominator of the ratio in the middle of (3). Since the players' strategies
are functions of their signals and all signals are independent and informative, we have
Pr[XN   Xn = (N   n)xj~ n;! = 1]
Pr[XN   Xn = 0j~ n;! = 1]
=
Pr[(sn+1;:::;sN) = 1j! = 1]





Pr[sn+k = 1j! = 1]
Pr[sn+k = 0j! = 1]

> 1
And as also xUn;1 (en 1;) > 0 (Lemma 1),
xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
<
Pr[XN   Xn = (N   n)xj~ n;! = 1]
Pr[XN   Xn = 0j~ n;! = 1]




Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 1]
Pr[XN   Xn = 0j~ n;! = 1]
xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
which, multiplying the two end-sides by Pr[XN   Xn = 0j~ n;! = 1], gives
N n X
k=0
Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 1]xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
> Pr[XN   Xn = 0j~ n;! = 1]xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
= (1   q)
N n xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
30For the denominator of the ratio in the middle of (3), on the other hand, we have
N n X
k=0




Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 0]xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
> (N   n + 1)xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
where the rst inequality is due to Lemma 2 while the second follows from the fact that




Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 0]xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
<  (N   n + 1)xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
And putting the last two inequalities together, gives
PN n
k=0 Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 1]xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
 
PN n





N   n + 1
!
xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
 xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)

establishing the rst part of the claim. For the second part, we have
N n X
k=0




Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;!]xUn;! (en;Xn 1)
for ! 2 f0;1g (Lemma 2). And, by Lemma 1,
N n X
k=0




Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 0]xUn;0 (en;Xn 1) >




k=0 Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 1]xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
 
PN n
k=0 Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 0]xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
<









Claim 2 The Limits of Altruism.
If MRSmax (Xn 1)  1
1;n   1, a no-contributions cascade starts in the nth period.
























k=0 Pr[XN   Xn = kxj~ n;! = 1]xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + kx)
PN n








As (5) is violated (and 1
1;n < 1
0;n), she will not contribute, regardless of her signal and
whatever her belief about the strategies of her successors. But this means also that her
action conveys no information upon which her successor can condition his own prior belief.




































where the second inequality follows from the fact that  
xUn+1;1(en+1;)
xUn+1;0(en+1;) is strictly decreasing.
That is, it is optimal also for the agent who acts in period n+1 to not contribute whatever
his signal, and irrespectively of the strategies of his successors. Proceeding inductively, for



































32it is a dominant strategy for each player to not contribute, irrespectively of the signal she
receives.
Corollary 3 As N ! +1, a contributions cascade cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose otherwise and let a contribution cascade equilibrium start in the nth period.
By this, we mean that all players from the nth onwards contribute irrespective of their
signals. For any n0  n, therefore, the amount of the public good at the beginning of the
n0th period, Xn0 1, is increasing in n0 while the priors, the posteriors, and the condition for
the preceding lemma to apply remain n, s;n, and MRSmax (Xn0 1)  1
1;n  1, respectively.
Recall, however, that  
xUn;1(en;)
xUn;0(en;) is strictly decreasing for all n. So must be MRSmax ().
And as Xn0 1 = Xn 1 + (n0   n)x, for large enough n0, the condition for the preceding
lemma to apply will be met. That is, from this n0 onwards, the unique subgame outcome
will be a no contribution cascade. Which is absurd, though, given our initial premise that a
contributions cascade takes place for all n0  n.
Claim 4 The Limits of Egoism
Dene the public good amount Gn by  
xUn;1(en;Gn)
xUn;0(en;Gn) = 1
0;n   1. If Xn 1  Gn, a no contri-
butions cascade starting with the nth player cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that a no contributions starting in the nth period is indeed
an equilibrium. On this equilibrium path, the nth player expects a payo
s;nUn;1 (en   x;x) + (1   s;n)U0;n (en   x;x)
if she contributes, and
s;nUn;1 (en;0) + (1   s;n)Un;0 (en;0)
if she doesn't, if she receives the signal s, and given that the strategy of all subsequent players
is to not contribute, irrespectively of their own signals. But since  
xUn;1(e1;)
xUn;0(e1;) is decreasing














The nth player will nd it, therefore, optimal to contribute, whatever her signal. Which
contradicts her part of the assumed equilibrium prole.
33Claim 5 A Basis for Altruism.38
If MRSmin (Xn 1 + (N   n)x)  1
0;n  1, a contributions cascade starting with the nth player
is an equilibrium.
Proof. We will show that it is an equilibrium, starting with the nth player, for every player
in the subsequent sequence to contribute, irrespective of her signal. Consider rst the nth
agent. Given that the strategy of all subsequent players is to contribute, irrespectively of
their own signals, her expected payo under the signal s 2 f0;1g is given by
s;nUn;1 (en   x;Xn 1 + (N   n + 1)x) + (1   s;n)Un;0 (en   x;Xn 1 + (N   n + 1)x)
if she contributes, and
s;nUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x) + (1   s;n)Un;0 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
if she doesn't. But
 
xUn;1 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)
xUn;0 (en;Xn 1 + (N   n)x)








The player will nd it optimal, therefore, to contribute, whatever her signal.
But if the action of the nth player is independent of her signal, the prior of her immediate
successor remains the same, n+1 = n, and so do his posterior beliefs, s;n+1 = s;n for
s = 0;1. Moreover, given that his predecessor has contributed, the public good endowment
of the n + 1th agent will be Xn = Xn 1 + x. And under the assume strategy prole of all
subsequent players, his expected payo, under either signal, is identical to that of the nth
agent. In other words, the decision problem of the player who is called upon to act in the
n+1 period is identical to that of the player who acted in the n period. Clearly, he will also
contribute whatever the signal he receives. Proceeding inductively leads to the conclusion
that all players will contribute, irrespectively of their signals.
Corollary 6 Suppose that initially there is no social endowment of the public good (X0 =
0). As x ! 0, a contributions cascade starting with the rst agent in the sequence is an
equilibrium.
38As a remark, notice that the respective conditions for the Claims 2 and 5 to apply cannot hold simulta-
neously. For the ratio  
xUn;1(c;)
xUn;0(c;) is strictly decreasing while 1;n > 0;n as the signal is informative.
34Proof. Observe rst that the condition for the preceding claim to apply in the rst period
is MRSmin (X0 + (N   1)x)  1








. Recall, moreover, that  
xUn;1(c;)
xUn;0(c;)
is strictly decreasing. In particular, for all n,  
xUn;1(en;G)
xUn;0(en;G) tends to +1 as G ! 0. It must
also be, therefore, limG!0 MRSmin (G) = +1. And, since limx!0 (N   1)x = 0, for small
enough x (and xed N), the condition for the preceding claim to apply in the rst period
will be met.
35